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Abstract
Based on the latest literatures, the paper proposes one 
theoretical framework: individuals pay general attention 
to rules of game and allocation process, but not just to 
results, produce fairness cognition for different resource 
allocation schemes through rules preferences and behavior 
expectation about partner and decide whether to accept 
allocation results; individual trust level is significantly 
associated with pro-society of partner, while this 
significance degree of correlation depends on fairness 
cognition. To further check existence of rules preferences 
and the influential factors, the paper designs one dictator 
game with veto purchasing (it can be converted into 
ultimatum game with decision position of both parties 
relatively more equal through purchasing and exercising 
veto) and trust game experiment, and sorts according to 
the veto bidding through inducing participants to state 
preference for two kinds of rules of game, measures 
fairness cognition for allocation scheme and tests role of 
two above on trust decision. 
Key words: Rules preferences; Fairness cognition; 
Trust experiment; Veto purchasing
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INTRODUCTION 
In Rationality and Freedom of Amartya Sen, “Regarding 
preference as foundation has more sufficient power in 
decision of personal private life compared with decision 
of other types, because private life does not directly affect 
other people. Individual desire is to make sufficient cause 
of selection in his own private sphere, but it is not full 
cause of selection any more in others’ private sphere or 
public sphere.” (Sen, 2006, p. 370). In that case, except 
preference, what factor does human choice in public 
sphere come from? Emerging experimental economics 
provides some standard setting studying this problem 
such as dictator game, ultimatum game and trust game. 
Through experiment setting exceeding private sphere, 
researcher characterizes social preference different from 
self-interest preference and uses it in analyzing individual 
choice behavior. This gives us the opportunity to more 
deeply understand forming and maintenance of human 
cooperation behavior in public sphere. 
Trust provides stable behavior expectation for 
cooperation in interpersonal communication. Early 
behavioral economics uses result-based social preference 
model (outcome-based social preference) and performs 
preliminary study on this; some studies also found that, 
cause of trust lies in social preference “paying close 
attention to other people and paying close attention to 
behavior cause of process”(Abdulkadirolu & Bagwell, 
2013; Berg, Dickhaut, & Mccabe, 1995; Bowles, 2004; 
Cox, 2004; Karlan, 2005). However, social preference 
is not a castle in the air, and will change accordingly 
with the changes of concrete environment and individual 
cognition. In the meantime, rules preferences come within 
the economists' vision, change in game position of both 
parties, reputation set up by repeated game, matching way, 
communication and learning, and other relative rules will 
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affect level of trust and cooperation. Preference for rules 
will even affect evolution process of the human society 
under grand view. 
The problem is that, even continuously bringing rules 
preferences into result-based social preference model just 
enlarges the scope of social preference, on one hand, it 
cannot reflect how individuals to self-reflect and adapt 
under preferred rule; on the other hand, only concentrating 
on one or multiple factors affecting cooperation degree 
would be biased sometimes. At the same time, few people 
study and pay attention to how to produce and evolve 
such basic rationality problems for cooperation after 
isolation heterogeneity, situation, rules and pro-society 
degree and other factors. Even so, using current social 
preference model to study perspective of trust is still 
based on behavior utilitarianism. We hold the opinion that, 
only under the view of standard utilitarianism, can social 
equity known by human rationality through concrete rules 
be the root of trust. 
Then, after introducing social preference and rules 
preferences, how do we select associated decision-making 
process through investigation and preferences, faith and 
action, thereby providing one micro foundation with 
empirical support for individual decision-making theory? 
In this way, the paper designs one dictator game with 
veto purchasing (it can be converted into ultimatum game 
through veto purchasing) and trust game experiment, 
to answer how procedural fairness cognition to affect 
trust in individual interaction, namely, through inducing 
participants to state endogenous preference for two kinds 
of rules of game, it measures cognition for whether 
to be fair for allocation scheme, and further uses this 
fairness cognition to clearly know forming mechanism of 
interpersonal trust decision. 
The rest of the paper is arranged as below: firstly 
narrate based on relative literatures, give our preliminary 
theoretical framework, then report one experiment design 
plan and procedure to be implemented, and finally discuss 
conclusion and prospect. 
1 .   I N V E S T I G AT E  T H E O R E T I C A L 
FRAMEWORK OF FAIRNESS COGNITION 
A N D  T R U S T  B A S E D  O N  R U L E S 
PREFERENCES
Competition or cooperation is eternal choice of human 
individuals in collective life. Under the assumption of 
“rational economic people”, individual rationality causing 
irrational social dilemma of collective always seems to 
make competition become result of this choice. However, 
during actual social communication process, different 
from egoism followed by “rational economic people”, 
individuals do not make decision blindly showing material 
benefit maximization many times, but have motivation 
of altruism at most of time when making decision. The 
economic approach to human behavior of Gary S. Becker 
pioneers rational choice model to interpret altruism 
preference, thereby making economics analyzing altruism 
behavior become possible. With behavior and experiment 
economics developing, through a number of studies, 
social preference is tried to be introduced into rational 
choice model, such as Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Charness and 
Rabin (2002) build one equation containing many social 
preference factors, use reciprocity factor, allocation 
preferences factor and other factors to investigate the 
influence on actor function. These models expand 
traditional rational choice model along Gary S. Becker 
route, but the social preference is just exogenously given, 
and still explains relationship between human choice 
object and subject under neoclassical economics “rational 
economic people ”, and does not involve interactive 
relationship between subject and object and between 
subjects of real human behavior decision-making. These 
defects do not prevent using social preference and 
explaining each kind of non-competitive cooperation 
behavior based on it, but it is still necessary to investigate 
formation mechanism of social preference at deeper level. 
1.1  Explanation of Social Preference 
Experiment for Trust Level and Trustworthiness 
Understanding forming mechanism for community 
cooperation of trust through social preference has 
undoubtedly important significance; a number of 
literatures of experiment economics commence this 
problem centering on trust game experiment. Earliest 
trust game experiments were from Berg et al. (1995)1. 
The experiment setting is similar to trust game of the 
paper: investment of the principals for the agent is added 
three times, the agent chooses to return to the principals. 
They also found that, return amount of the agent is at 
least as much as investment amount of the principals, so 
reciprocal preferences explain motivation for investment 
of the principals and return of the agent. Cox (2004) 
decomposed standard trust game experiment into three-in-
one small game, found that investment and return in game 
are not only affected by reciprocal preferences, but also 
may be affected by risk preference, altruism preference 
and demographics factor. 
Method of Butler, Giuliano, and Guiso (2012) is 
similar to the paper to some degree. Their analysis logic 
is based on conclusion of Gneezy (2005)—“Moral 
preference will be affected by the strength of malicious 
act harming other people, and further decides cognition 
of people for cheating and finally affects decision policy 
1Experiment method measures revealed preference, while another 
method investigates stated preference through questionnaire. 
However, the latter is controversial, e.g., Karlan (2005) and Butler et 
al. (2012). Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000) think 
that, experiment method can better measure trust or reciprocity of 
people under specific environment. 
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of the agent”. Trust game setting used by them deepens 
experiment results of Cox (2004). They use cognition of 
participants for whether decision of the opposite side to be 
“cheating”, and extract how values of “competition” and 
“cooperation” to affect cognition for “cheating” through 
questionnaire. The bigger the “cooperation” proportion 
in values is, the higher the cognition degree for the 
“cheating” is. Only higher trust level and trustworthiness 
of opposite side can be regarded as proper behavior, 
thereby deciding affecting subsequent decision. The 
bigger the “competition” proportion in values is, the lower 
the cognition degree for “cheating” is, namely, both lower 
trust level and trustworthiness will be regarded as proper 
behavior, thereby affecting subsequent decision. 
However, there are two problems existing in this 
literature using this social preference to study trust.
Firstly, under changeable environment, trust motivation 
forming mechanism changes, then are these conclusions 
using social preference to study trust still steady? Under 
different situations, cognition and decision of individual 
on environment also will significantly change. Tversky 
and Kahneman (1986) proposed framing effect to explain 
variable preference, namely, because individual preference 
is caused and formed from decision background, decision 
procedure and other situational framework, change of 
situation will make individual preference change and 
even reverse. Not only that, affected by frame, individual 
decision can be finally formed through evaluation 
process. Recent experiment also shows that personal 
preference will obviously reverse under specific situation. 
E.g., Fershtman, Gneezy, and List (2012) even found 
that aversion for equality: when specific environment 
encourages competition and affirms caused inequality 
is fair, participants will show very strong competition 
and selfish preference, but not inequity aversion. Bolton 
and Ockenfels (2006) proposed three kinds of judgment, 
used for proving no existence of one general social 
motivation collection independent from the situation: not 
all individuals measure fairness using same way; There 
is close relationship between fairness and reciprocity; 
specific system type will make individual decision 
behavior deviate from own preference characteristics. 
Secondly, many scholars come to realize that, such 
result-based social preference model only stresses aversion 
influence efficacy of people on unequal results. In fact, the 
process producing inequality and cognition of participants 
during process realizing allocation result have key role on how 
people to evaluate this inequality2. That is to say, people’s 
demands of fairness has significant effect on the function, 
furthermore, standard of people regarding fairness depends 
on wealth inequality of people is process of generation, rather 
than inequality degree of wealth level on simple result. 
2In fact, some studies such as Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004); 
Falk and Fischbacher (2006) use intention-based model to study 
cooperation between people, but finally restore cooperation 
reciprocity and faith about others. 
1.2  Influence of Rules Or Procedures on 
Decision Making 
In recent years, some experiment economics literatures 
have already noticed that result-based social preference 
model cannot give reasonable and consistent explanation 
for many phenomena, concrete selection process and 
procedure has indelible importance for social preference 
of individuals and cooperation between individuals. In 
this way, the paper investigates how selected process 
and procedure to affect social preference of people and 
cooperation between people, so it is necessary to briefly 
comb these literatures. 
Classical literatures of Charness and Rabin (2002) 
provide some experiment results to prove that attraction 
of same allocation result is very different for participants: 
same allocation result. In different reference system, 
people have very different understandings for the fairness 
degree. This makes economists reflect whether to simplify 
fairness consideration into inequity aversion to be proper 
or not. Allocation scheme of dictator reflects cognition of 
participants for fairness, while such cognition is not stable 
and has more to do with the concrete environment. List 
(2007) uses dictator game to simply expand and prove this 
point. In standard dictator game, 71% dictators choose to 
transfer some of five dollars to the opposite side. However, 
when dictator has the opportunity taking five dollars away 
from the opposite side at the same time, only 10% dictators 
choose to transfer some of arning to the opposite side. 
Under the latter situation, cognition of dictator for fairness 
is obviously different from the former: they will think that 
choosing not to take five dollars from the opposite side 
is very fair. Many experiments based on dictator game 
such as Dana, Cain, and Dawes (2006), Dana, Weber, 
and Kuang (2007), Oberholzer-Gee and Eichenberger 
(2008) and Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) equally 
illustrate that concrete process and motivation have more 
fundamental influence on fairness cognition compared 
with results. Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels (2005) more 
directly proves importance of procedural fairness and 
uses experiments to demonstrate that people attach more 
importance to process fairness but not to results3. 
These literatures enrich and expand social preference 
model in early period, but some problems still exist. 
Firstly, procedural preference and function of participants 
3Wherein, proponent has two options: A (1800, 200) or C (200, 
1800), proponent choosing to accept or refuse causes that both 
parties gain nothing. While in final ultimatum game of another 
standard, only difference is that, proponent also has another choice 
B (1000, 1000). While the third game is final ultimatum game of 
fairness, proponent cannot choose B, and can choose A or C and 
another risk choice, as soon as responder accepts it, with probability 
of 50: 50, allocation of both parties will be (1800, 200) or (200, 
1800). In the third game, two kinds of results of risk choice are not 
fair, but the process is fair, because it gives fair risk probability 
distribution and expected revenue. Reject rate for A in the first game 
is only 6%, while reject rate for A in the latter two is up to 41%, this 
is obviously consistent with understanding of previous literatures for 
fairness cognition. Reject rate for B in the second game and for risk 
choice in the third game is almost 0. 
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are indirectly measured in experimental setting of these 
literatures and are reflected by passive action selection. 
Secondly, among these literatures, it is hard to show rules 
faced by participants under concrete situation and how 
choice made under corresponding rules to interact with 
inner moral evaluation and fairness cognition. While the 
paper reflects how endogenous selection rules to interact 
with individual inner moral evaluation and fairness 
cognition through experiment device with veto purchasing 
mechanism, thereby inheriting and developing social 
preference theory. 
1.3  Study Idea of the Paper 
Above problems are generated by neglect of neoclassical 
economics rationality visions for value rationality for 
long time. Rationality selection theory under neo-classic 
emphasizes existence of self with rationality as main 
body according to “self-centeredness welfare”, “self-
centeredness target” and “self-set goal selection”. Sen 
thinks that, these three aspects do not clarify whether 
individual goal to contain measures of welfare for others. 
Therefore, Sen expands role of rationality in rational 
choice theory, “the place of personal reasoning and self-
examination playing role—the substantial place playing 
role. One man is one entity which can enjoy consumption, 
experience and predict the welfare and has goals, as well 
as one entity which can examine the value and goal and 
select according to these values and goals” (Sen, 2006, p. 
25), this is reasonable review. 
In fact, intention and faith of participants during 
generation process of equality or inequality allocation 
result has a key role on how to evaluate allocation status. 
That is to say, whether allocation to be fair or not is 
essential for people function feeling, while identification 
of people for whether to be fair depends on how to form 
allocation process and rules, but not single physical 
benefit allocation result. Key factor concerning social 
preference of others lies in that, evaluation of status 
depends on how other people experience such status4. 
Accordingly, value rationality contains evaluation and 
concern about welfare of others, just like in Theory of 
Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith, foundation of moral 
judgments is described as one “fair observer”, it is 
regarded as “rational, moral and conscientious people in 
your heart, and great judges and arbitrators judging our 
behavior” (Smith, 1997, p. 165). 
In experimental setting of the paper, through inducing 
participants costly choose whether to have veto, the 
paper characterizes rules preferences for higher power 
value, expresses cognition for fairness allocation 
proportion through selectively exercising veto, and further 
4In trust game, principals with rule preference have same faith of 
rule preference for the agent, and may give investment amount 
according to equality and reciprocity, but not completely self-
considered zero investment; principals without rule preference will 
make decision according to material income maximization. 
investigates how this fairness cognition to affect trust 
level of the principals and trustworthiness of the agent 
in trust game. Through such setting, we can more deeply 
understand role of value rationality played by fairness 
cognition.
In a word, motivation of people is embedded in 
concrete game environment and procedure, therefore, how 
people to evaluate fairness and make interaction decision 
with others according to fairness standard also depend 
on concrete game environment and procedure. The paper 
inherits and develops this idea, also emphasizes influence 
of fairness cognition for decision behavior motivation 
especially for interpersonal trust under rules preferences. 
2.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN SCHEME
The experiment is divided into four modules: firstly, 
declaration and signature of voluntarily participating and 
questionnaire about sexuality, age, professional and other 
personal information. Secondly, after experimenter reads 
the instructions of experiment and guarantees participants 
to understand experiments, he shall carry out test of 
control problems, to help participants better understand 
calculation of benefit payment in lab. Thirdly, formal 
experiment, including two stages: 
The first stage is about veto purchasing, randomly 
two-by-two matched participants will be respectively 
regarded as proponent and responder for allocating 
wealth W of specific amount. Allocation rule corresponds 
to dictator game or ultimatum game; if responder uses 
initial endowment given before experiment to purchase 
veto (as soon as veto is exercised, both parties gain 
nothing) for proponent allocation scheme, then game that 
participants take part in is ultimatum game; if responder 
does not use initial endowment to purchase veto, then 
game that participants take part in is dictator game. In 
description of experiment, participants are prohibited from 
communicating with others during experiment process. 
Specific decision making order is as below: 
a) Proponent and responder respectively have initial 
endowment of 10 bargaining chips. Responder firstly acts, 
costly choose whether to purchase veto for proponent 
plan, bi is recorded as cost∈[0, 10] (taking 0 means 
giving up purchasing), the higher the bid is, the bigger 
the probability purchasing veto is; after veto is purchased, 
select whether to exercise veto after proponent acts5. 
Proponent does not know decision behavior of responder 
whether to purchase veto when making decision. 
b) Proponent goes into action, under the premise that 
5Because intention of the paper is to induce bid cut point when 
participants select purchasing veto, considering influence of cut 
point on subsequent decision behavior, information feedback by 
computer to participants is that when bid is more than 0, and can 
purchase veto, thereby making game become final ultimatum game 
from dictator game. Of course, participants do not know such 
computer procedure setting. 
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proponent does not know whether responder to select 
purchasing veto or whether veto have been purchased, 
determine allocation proportion of offer∈[0, 1] and 
distribute wealth with maximum W to responder. 
c) After proponent selects allocation scheme, responder 
finds wealth proportion allocated by proponent, then 
chooses whether to exercise veto. Of course, participants 
without purchasing veto can only accept the proposal 
according to dictator rules of game. 
d) Participants change roles and continue veto 
purchasing again. 
The second stage is trust game, after veto purchasing 
of the first stage is ended, matched participants enter 
trust game experiment. Different from veto purchasing 
of the first stage, at this stage, trust game between 
participants is made only once, roles are not changed. 
We use p to represent the principals in trust game, a to 
represent the agent in trust game, accordingly use p and a 
to refer to the principals and the agent at trust game stage, 
which are respectively used as decision of proponent or 
responder at the first stage. In trust game, the principals 
have wealth with initial endowment of 50, while initial 
endowment of the agent is zero. The principals decide to 
give the agent choice∈[0, 50] investment, investment 
received by the agent will be added three times. Then 
the agent will decide the amount of return return∈[0, 
3choice] to the principals. Therefore, for both parties, 
optimal decision is the principals’ investment choice=50, 
return amount of the agent return=75. Specific decision 
making order is as blow: 
a) Before formally performing trust game experiment, 
under the situation not knowing own identity yet, all 
participants shall firstly carry out analog experiments of 
four options to measure the declarative preference (stated 
preference):6
(1) If regarding oneself as the principals, how much 
investment will be made to the agent? 
(2) If regarding oneself as the principals, based on (1) 
selected investment, how much shall the agent return?
(3) If regarding oneself as the agent, based on (1) 
selected investment, how much do you return?
(4) If regarding oneself as the agent, when the 
principals invest all 50 wealth to you, how much do you 
return? 
After analogue experiment of four options are finished, 
real trust game experiment is started. 
b) The principals select choice∈[0, 50] 
investment to 
the agent, investment received by the agent will be added 
three times. 
6True simulation options do not only include three involved in the 
paper, but also contain others, (1) If regarding oneself as the agent, 
how much does him return to principal; (2) In case of being principal 
himself, how much do you think the agent will the agent return? In 
fact, analog experiment involved in trust game experiment is more 
like one questionnaire, so that participants can clarify rules. 
c) The agent decides to return return∈[0, 3choice] to 
the principals, experiment is ended. 
The fourth module: after formal experiment tasks 
of two stages are finished, bargaining chip earned by 
participants taking part in game is exchanged for money, 
experiment is ended. See Figure 1.
Responder
Proposer
Responder
Principal
Agent
(1-offer)W+10
offerW+10
1 100
0 1 0 1
cost
offer offer
cost
10
10-cost
(1-offer)W+10
offerW+10-cost
0 50
0 3choice
choice
return
50-choice+return
3choice-return
Bid purchasing Trust Games
Refuse Accept
Responder
Responder
Proposer
Proposer
Figure 1
Experimental Procedures 
CONCLUSION AND PROSPECT
Trust makes that behavior of both parties can be expected 
and consensus is formed. Trust between people and 
between people and organization exceeds acquaintance 
society; it can make market order expanded. Previous 
studies give many deep insights. However, it does not 
more deeply understand faith occurrence and evolution 
mechanism from rules of endogenous and interaction 
between personal inner preference, faith and value 
judgment. Based on economic decision models of 
preference, faith and behavior, from social preference, the 
paper analyzes and pays attention to rules preferences of 
process and tries to test influence of preference and faith 
for trust decision in lab. 
Through using inequality relationship of different level 
reflected by dictator game and ultimatum game, we firstly 
investigate whether individuals to have rules preferences 
and sort according to the price to be paid and fairness 
cognition for allocation proportion. Then, trust game 
investigates trust level of both participating parties and 
motivation of two decision behavior of trustworthiness. We 
try to restore motivation of decision behavior into value 
judgment under cognition rationality, thereby showing 
human rationality problem affecting substance of trust 
and cooperation presented. Compared with existing social 
preference model, explanation of the paper is close to 
rational connotation contained by “Fair observer” of Adam 
Smith and “reasonable review” of Sen to some degree. 
Furthermore, environment nature of lab still cannot 
more comprehensively reflect complexity in true social 
communication, but still has some value for exploring 
targeted issue. Based on trying to overcome compact 
form of model and purity of preference which can be 
characterized, one-time game is to be expanded to 
repeated game and external or internal incentive measures 
are to be added in trust game in the future, thereby 
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restoring human rationality and value judgment affecting 
social communication under more realistic environment. 
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